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Abstract: If time is measured through the arduous lives of millions who for centuries have lived 
and died under the yoke of sameness, it is done so in China. Assisting this process throughout the 
dynasties and the more recent communist government‘s stint, imagined identity constructs have 
portrayed Chinese people‘s self-actualization as a collective surrender to a glorious polity, 
something greater than they as individuals could ever be. The venerated ancient Confucian 
Legalistic scholars viewed themselves as part of a heavenly dynasty for which the average soldier 
lived and died. While claiming to free people from such enslavement, 20
th
 century communist 
revolutionary leader Mao Zedong promoted the identity construct, the Chinese People, an 
imagined vision of triumph over tyranny existing only in surrender to yet another all powerful 
polity that governed for, not through them. More recently, these Chinese People are portrayed in 
pursuit of yet another liberatory vision, Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream, the promise of material 
success at the cost of governmental consistency. 
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Beginning in the mid 20
th
 and into the 
following century, China rose to economic super 
power status, leading some scholars to claim that 
the future belongs to the Chinese (Becker, 2007; 
Kurlantzick, 2007). Undergirding this surge toward 
greatness, since the 1949 communist nation‘s birth, 
political leaders have worked tireless to promote a 
unified national identity, ―the aspect of individuals‘ 
self-image that is tied to their nations, together with 
the value and emotional significance they attach to 
membership in the national community‖ (Gries, 
2005, p. 9). It is termed the Chinese people or 
merely the Chinese (including non Han Chinese 
assimilated groups) who triumphed over tyranny. 
Moving on into 21
st
 century post revolutionary 
China, Communist Party (CCP) leaders have 
initiated another quest for the Chinese people, to 
pursue the Chinese Dream, a socioeconomic 
success vision for some that commands collective 
international esteem (Xi Jinping, 2013). However, 
rhetoric does not often reflect reality, because 
throughout the annals of time, politically one thing 
remains in China—autocracy, rationalized by and 
deeply rooted in Sino-centrism, Legalism, and a 
coopted version of Confucianism (Gries, 2005). 
This article uses primary and secondary sources to 
trace these ancient filaments of China‘s past and 
present that lead to and sustain subjugation. 
Social constructivism, a popular 
international relations lens, might claim that we all 
stand on the shoulders of those who came before 
(Wendt, 1999). Historically, culturalism is the 
precursor of nationalism (Duara, 1995). In China, 
the former defined community membership ―by 
participation in a ritual order that embodied 
allegiance to Chinese ideas and ethics, which 
revolved around the Chinese emperor‖ (Duara, 
1995, p. 58). In contrast, ―the nation,‖ Anderson 
writes, ―is an imagined political community…[,] 
sovereign [yet] limited,‖ making nationalistic unity 
tenuous due to the many subgroups with which 
individuals may identify (Anderson, 2006, p. 2). To 
maintain unilateral coherence, an authoritarian 
government, in particular, must continually 
orchestrate communally oriented, identity shaping 
signs, symbols, and words (Blumer, 1969; Mead, 
1934/1967). In communist China many of these 
signifiers derive from pre-nationalistic culturalism. 
Thus, the Chinese people is less about ―political 
ideologies‖ and more about an historical, ―cultural 
system.‖ (Anderson, 2006, p.12). Viewing national 
Chinese identity from this perspective conforms to 
the belief that the Chinese communist 
revolutionary ideology and a subsequent national 
conception of what it means to be Chinese should 
be interpreted from multiple perspectives (Chirot, 
1994, Giroux, 2000, Palmer, 1997). 
http://english.people.com.cn/200303/12/eng200303
12_113156.shtml 
Before threading the past with the present 
we must look briefly at the various manifestations 
of Chinese people in contemporary political 
orations, symbolizing 65 (1949-2014) years of 
Communist dictatorship. On October 1
st
 1949, the 
People's Republic, known in Chinese as ―Kaiguo 
dadian” (开国大典), inaugurated Mao Zedong 
who stood atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace in 
Tiananmen Square and declared, ―The Chinese 
people (emphasis ours) have stood up! China will 
never again be an insulted nation‖ (Mao, 1 October 
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1949, n.p.). Instead he prophesized it would spread 
its grandeur throughout the world. That said, the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) was official, 
with its national capital in Peking (Beijing).  
Yet, after fleeing to Taiwan Island in 
1949, Chiang Kai-shek, head of the governing 
Kuomingtang or Nationalist Party (KMT), also 
insisted that his Republic of China (ROC) 
embodied the Chinese people’s identity. For 
example, during Chiang‘s and successor Chiang 
Qing-kuo‘s tenures, ―being an upright Chinese 
people‖ was engraved on the exterior walls of 
many Taiwanese school buildings and printed on 
the cover page of each Taiwanese student‘s 
workbook (Rejection of Chinese Patriotic Slogan 
on Workbooks By Democratic Progressive Party 
Senator, 2005). It is no surprise then that Mao and 
the CCP also used the historical Sino-centric notion 
as an argument for Chinese unity. In the 1949 
Proclamation of the Central People‘s Government, 
the chairman reiterated, ―the people throughout 
China have been plunged into bitter suffering and 
tribulations since the Chiang Kai-shek Kuomintang 
reactionary government betrayed the fatherland, 
colluded with imperialists, and lunched the 
counter-revolutionary war‖ (Cited in Kao and 
Leung, 1986, p.10). Far from reconciled, the KMT 
in Taiwan countered that the CCP was a lackey of 
the Soviet Union, sullying the sanctity of the 
Chinese people (Chen, 1974). 
Throughout the following decades, PRC 
leaders continued to call for reintegration of the 
shibboleth Chinese people. For example, in January 
1995, President Jiang Zeming delivered a speech 
entitled, ―Continuing to Strive Toward the 
Reunification of China.‖ In short he said, ―we shall 
try our best to achieve the peaceful reunification of 
China since Chinese people should not fight 
Chinese people‖ (Jiang, 30 January 1995, n.p.). Hu 
Jingtao, Jiang‘s successor, made similar remarks at 
a 60
th
 anniversary of China celebration.  
Confucianism and Legalism the Bedrock of a 
Collectivist National Identity 
During the Zhou Dynasty (1050-256 
BCE) K'ung Fu Tzu (Confucius) envisioned 
Chinese leaders as embodying a somewhat 
different morality-based mandate. Born in 551 
BCE, Confucius hailed from Lu during a time 
known for lax scruples, to put it mildly, among 
governmental officials. Confucius (1999) countered 
that ethics and government should be inseparable, 
explaining, ―govern the people by regulations, keep 
order among them by chastisements, and they will 
flee from you and lose all self-respect. Govern 
them by moral force, keep order among them by 
ritual and they will keep their self-respect and 
come to you of their own accord‖ (p.76).  
To spread the word he traveled 
extensively during his early years even conversing 
with Daoism‘s founder, Lao Zi. But during his 50s 
Confucius returned home and served as a city 
magistrate and later Grand Secretary of Justice. 
Disheartened by political corruption, he again left 
the country with a group of students and roamed 
parts of China, offering reformatory advice to any 
titular head who would listen (Confucius, 1999). 
Eventually Confucius resettled in Lu to 
teach and write. In essence his ideas provide a 
personal spiritual guide, emphasizing honesty, 
etiquette, and mutual respect within relationships. 
These should pervade families that in turn nurture 
mutual parent/child respect, with the father as 
principled leader (Shen, 2001). He also held that 
practicing his principles with ―barbarians‖ would 
assimilate them into the fold, writing, ―the Yi and 
Di barbarian tribes with rulers are not as viable as 
the various Chinese states without them‖ 
(Confucius, 1999, p. 83). Mencius, Confucius‘s 
most outstanding follower, maintained that the 
Chinese (Hua华) had a duty to civilize (Yi华) the 
outside world, penning, ―'I have heard of men using 
Chinese customs to transform barbarians, but I 
have never yet heard of any being changed by 
barbarians‖ (Mencius, 2009, p.54). Powered by 
Confucian edicts of propriety and ethical behavior, 
its national identity portrayed a lone civilization 
lead by the only lawful emperor (Fairbank and 
Goldman, 2006). 
Unfortunately, during the first unification 
of China under the Qin dynasty (221-206 BC) 
Confucianism became entwined with Sino-centric 
Legalism that emphasized the importance of harsh 
law and power politics. As pioneer of the Legalist 
school Shang Yang (338BCE/1928) explained, ―If 
you govern by penal laws, the people will fear, 
being fearful, they will commit no villainies, there 
being no villainies, they will find peace and 
happiness, if, on the other hand, you govern by 
mere righteousness, they will be lax, and if they are 
lax, there will be disorder and the people will suffer 
great miseries‖ (p. 146). Although some 
contemporary scholars point to the sharp contrast 
between Legalism (Moore, 1967) and Confucius‘ 
notion of ruling by virtue, many academics agree 
that both perspectives had just enough emphasis on 
a strict social status hierarchy and a tightly 
centralized political system that government 
officials could meld the old and new ideas into one 
(Feng, Zhou, and He, 1990). It rationalized 
governmental, economic, and personal 
strangleholds on the Chinese people. 
Widespread rebellions finally overthrew 
the Qin dynasty. To formalize order during the 
subsequent Western Han dynasty (206 B.C-9 A.D) 
the imperial government created a certified body of 
knowledge derived from Confucian, Sino-centrist, 
Legalistic thought. That is, the Han rulers forged an 
imperial Confucianism where Legalistic logic 
enacted Confucian thoughts—hence the marriage 
between autocratic rulers and Confucian 
bureaucrats (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006). This 
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synthesis solidified ancient emperors‘ authority and 
influenced Chinese people‘s perception of 
themselves, politics, and society.  
During the Sui-Tang Dynasties (581-618 
and 618-907, respectively) the imperial 
government established a classic examination 
system to enforce its ruling foundation. By the 
Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) era, it comprised a 
backbreaking course of classic study culminating in 
a civil service examination that existed in some 
form until 1905 when it was terminated under the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). At least, in theory, 
regardless of social status, men, even male 
―barbarians,‖ who passed examinations could serve 
as civil officials for the ruling class. Not unlike 
many 21
st
 century Chinese, these scholars became 
part of the order and cherished a feeling of 
belonging to a renowned cultural and political 
community. They imagined ancient China, as a 
heavenly dynasty located in the central part of the 
world and surrounded by peripheral nomadic tribes 
(Grieder, 1981). These ―learned‖ men epitomized 
what it meant to become Chinese, honored and 
chained by duty at the same time (Zheng, 1999). 
According to historian Chiort, under ancient 
tyrannical rulers, ―once the imposition of suffering 
became the accepted way of exercising political 
power…the humiliation and deprivation imposed 
on most people came to be seen as entirely normal‖ 
(Chiort, 1994, p. 4).
1
  
One historical figure, Yue Fei (1103-
1142), epitomizes the role of a Chinese citizen 
living under the Confucianism, Sino-centrist, 
legalistic rule. Yue Fei, a scholar general during the 
Southern Song Dynasty (1127-1279), devoted his 
lifetime to expelling barbarians from China. 
According to the historical record, the general had 
four Chinese characters tattooed across his back, 
which mean ―serve your country with the greatest 
loyalty‖(China to Commemorate Ancient Patriot 
Yue Fei, 2013). As a patriotic official, Yue‘s poetry 
swells with enthusiasm for thoughtfully serving the 
emperors. Even as a national hero Yue was one of 
Emperor Song Gao Zong‘s many servants, not an 
independent citizen. So when he and others shed 
blood fighting barbarian invasions, they were 
protecting the emperor‘s private property. 
Ironically after decades of successful military 
service, Qin Hui (1091-1155), an influential 
political figure who feared Yue‘s notoriety, goaded 
the emperor into sentencing Yue to death. A 
testimony to the loss of self within a collectivist 
national identity, before his execution Yue 
                                           
1
 It must be noted, however, that 
regardless of absolute rule, China was at least 
a counterpart of Rome and far more 
sophisticated than medieval Europe (Fairbank 
and Goldman, 2005, p. 2).  
repeatedly urged his family and subordinates to 
remain loyal to the emperor (Qian, 1998).  
By the 17
th
 century, China‘s self-absorbed 
national identity caused it politically to withdraw 
from, rather than reform the outside world, but 
Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), a famous Confucian 
scholar in the late Qing dynasty, was still repeating 
Yue‘s now common refrain. For example, Zeng 
exhorted his daughter to faithfully serve the 
social/political order, saying, ―After you get 
married, you must firmly obey a hierarchy of 
superior-inferior relationship. … Subjects must be 
loyal even when princes are cruel, sons cannot be 
obedient even when fathers are not kind, wives 
cannot be virtuous and tolerant even though 
husbands are not responsible‖ (Zeng, 2008, p.113).  
Eventually, during the 19
th
 century China 
fell prey to a new flock of barbarians (Yi)—the 
United States, England, France, Russia, and Japan. 
Triumphant Western invasions eventually 
undermined Chinese pride (Gries, 2005), which 
gradually dissipated, even among the gentry. Early 
on Canton was China‘s only internationally open 
port. There, the co-hong guild of Chinese 
merchants was the lone entity authorized to deal 
with the British who were quite interested in 
Chinese silk, porcelain, tea, opium, and the like. 
The widespread disruption of a somewhat self 
contained economic system lead to the First Opium 
War (1839-1842) between Britain and China, 
resulting in the Treaty of Nanjing (1842), which 
gave the British greater port access to China and 
control over Hong Kong, to name a few 
concessions. France, Russia, Germany, and Japan 
soon jumped on the bandwagon and bullied China 
into giving them greater trade access as well. 
Efforts to meet export demands produced 
unbalanced crop rotation systems, contributing to 
China‘s growing economic instability and giving 
way to the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), a 
peasant revolt where more people were killed than 
in World War One. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-
1895) over Korea also ended in Chinese defeat, 
while the Chinese peoples‘ Boxer Rebellion (1898-
1900) brought further financial and emotional 
devastation. What began as a civil insurrection 
eventually turned outward when the empress Cixi 
successfully blamed foreign intervention for the 
country‘s woes, encouraging rebels to destroy 
several foreign embassies for which China was 
then forced to pay (Chiort, 1994; Palmer, 1997; 
Zhao, 2004).  
Thus, Confucian, Sino-centrist, Legalism 
would lay buried within Chinese culture, waiting 
for Mao and his successors to resurrect the latter 
two and fashion them into Zhonghua minzu (中华
民族), which refers to a national, successfully 
assimilated, preeminent identity— the Chinese 
nation/people or Chinese race (Leibold, 2007). Not 
unlike Germany during the post World War One 
era, ―narratives about the ‗Century of 
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Humiliation‘‖ would mobilize this reinvention, a 
statement to the world that China was ultimately 
victorious over its enemies and was in fact a 
formidable international force (Gries, 2005, p. 47).  
Historical Roots of Chinese Revolution 
Ge Ming 
In contemporary China, the word 
―revolution‖ has been translated into ―Ge Ming‖ (
革命). In one Confucian canon, The Book of 
Change, ―Ge Ming‖ means the overthrow of an 
existing dynasty by violent force (Feng, Zhou, and 
He, 1990). Historically ―Ge Ming‖ manifested 
itself in ―peasant rebellions‖ giving way to ―a 
dictatorship by emperors‖ (Li, 2003, p.138). Most 
ordinary Chinese people came to view ―Ge Ming‖ 
as the only natural evolution of Chinese society and 
remained captivated by imperial authority. Despite 
hunger and the need for arable land, peasant 
revolutionaries could never disentangle themselves 
from this mindset (Li, 2003). For example, when 
the tide of republican revolution rose against the 
Qing Dynasty, the last imperial government, the 
Chinese peasantry conceptualized its revolt as 
reactionary, a restoration of the Ming dynasty 
(1368-1644) and revival of Han Chinese 
preeminence (Grieder, 1981).  
Lu Xun, the father of modern Chinese 
literature, illustrates the trivialization of revolution 
in the True Story of Al-Q (Lu, 1921). In one 
particular scene Al-Q, the protagonist, was largely 
―entranced‖ and entertained by revolution. He 
delighted in the terror of all the villagers who were 
caught in the middle of a peasant rebellion against 
authority. In one passage Lu wrote,  
 
 ‗Revolution is not a bad thing,‘ thought Al-Q. 
‗Finish off the whole lot of them …Curse them! I 
would like to go over to the revolutionaries 
myself.‘… He had drunk two bowls of wine at 
noon on an empty stomach. Consequently, he 
became drunk very quickly… in some curious way, 
he felt as if the revolutionaries were himself, and 
all the people in (his hometown of) Weichuang 
were his captives. Unable to contain himself for 
joy, he could not help shouting loudly: ‗Rebellion! 
Rebellion!‘ (Lu, 1921, Chapter 7, n.p.) 
Ironically, although Mao claimed to 
admire Lu, the author never joined the CCP 
(Denton, 2002), and his critique of ―Ge Ming‖ 
portended the creation of a communist dictatorship 
that merely replaced the KMT. Mao, however, held 
that his revolution was a social one where ―basic 
changes in social…and…political structure occur 
together in a mutually-reinforcing 
fashion…through intense sociopolitical conflicts in 
which class struggles play a key role‖ (Skocpol, 
1979, p. 5). In truth, the communist insurrection 
was similar to an old-fashioned Chinese peasant 
rebellion with similar outcomes—a persistent 
monocratic government (Skocpol, 1979). 
Confucianism and The Communist Revolution 
In anticipation of leading his country, Mao 
did try to purge from the Chinese consciousness 
one earmark of antiquity, original Confucian 
thought. From Mao‘s perspective Confucius was a 
spokesman of Chinese feudalism and an oppressive 
class system. As early as 1940, in ―On New 
Democracy,‖ the soon-to-be chairman wrote, 
―those who worship Confucius and advocate 
reading the classics of Confucianism stand for the 
old ethics, old rites and old thoughts against the 
new culture and new thought…As imperialist 
culture and semi-feudal culture serve imperialism 
and the feudal class, they should be eliminated‖ 
(Mao, 1940, Chapter xi, n.p.).  
From 1966 to1976 the Cultural Revolution 
also contained an anti-Confucian campaign. Mao‘s 
secretary Chen Boda pronounced in a Ren Min Ri 
Bao (The People’s Daily) editorial ―Sweep Away 
All Monsters and Demons,‖ ―a great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution must be launched against the 
old ideas, old culture, old customs and old habits 
and all things opposed to the thought of Mao 
Zedong‖ (Chen Boda, 1986, n.p.). Again in 1967, 
Ren Min Ri Bao published a Red Guard of Peking 
University article that insisted, ―to struggle against 
Confucius, the feudal mummy, and thoroughly 
eradicate…reactionary Confucianism is one of our 
important task in the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution‖ (Red Guard of Peking University, 10 
January 1966, n. p.).  
Continuity Between the CCP Regime and Ancient 
Chinese Tyranny 
Ironically, Mao clung to Sino-centric 
Legalism (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006). As a 
young man he appreciated early Legalist Shang 
Yang‘s perspective despite its obvious 
inconsistencies with Marxian egalitarianism, 
particularly referring to the proletariat (Spence, 
1999). Li Rui (1999), one of Mao‘s former 
secretaries, recalls that Mao studied statecraft from 
an historical Chinese perspective. He read 
emperors‘ biographies over and over again and put 
classic, despotic, legalistic tactics into practice. 
Keeping his political rivals guessing, he suddenly 
appointed the same people he had recently 
deposed. Further, he was a master of ―divide and 
conquer,‖ incorporating power politics theory to 
launch the Anti-rightist movement (1957 to 1959) 
to eliminate conservatives within the CCP, the 
Great Leap Forward (1958 to 1961) to move China 
from an agrarian to an industrial collectivist 
political economy, and the Cultural Revolution to 
eviscerate earmarks of capitalism (Perry, 2007, 
p.11).  
A stunning example of Mao‘s captivation 
with imperial power was his repeated accolades for 
Emperor Qin Shi Huang, a harsh martinet who 
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united China in 221 BC and reigned terror on 
intellectuals who comprised the Hundred Schools 
of Thought (770 to 221 BCE) (Li, 1999). In May of 
1958, during the Second Session of the Eighth 
Party Congress, Mao boasted,  
 [Emperor Qin Shi Huang] only buried alive 460 
scholars, while we buried 46,000. In our 
suppression of the counter-revolutionaries, did we 
not kill some counter-revolutionary intellectuals? I 
once debated with the democratic people: You 
accuse us of acting like Qing Shi Huang, but you 
are wrong; we surpass him 100 times. You berate 
us for imitating Qing Shi Huang in enforcing 
dictatorship. We admit them all. What is regrettable 
is that you did not say enough. We have had to say 
it for you. (Mao, 8-23 May 1958, n.p.) 
In his later years, Mao even called himself as a 
combination of Emperor Qin and Marx (Li, 1999). 
Mao also applied ancient practices to his 
foreign policy. Beginning in 1949 the CCP 
attempted to establish a new type of ―tributary 
system‖ within the communistic world, in which 
Mao and China were the red sun at the center 
(Chang and Chen, 2012, p. 91). That is to say, a 
new Han Chinese Sino-centrism, dubbed Mao‘s 
Han chauvinism in 1956, echoed the classic Sino-
centrist worldview (Knight, 2007).  
In sum, Mao took advantage of what 
Martin calls unexamined cultural liabilities to fuel 
his political machine (Martin, 2002). Hoffer 
eloquently yet simply explains how historical 
memes buried within a peoples‘ culture can make 
them susceptible to revolutions that in the name of 
freedom for all, further enslave (Hoffer, 1951). 
Such followers have an ―innermost craving…for a 
new life—a rebirth— or, failing this, a chance to 
acquire new elements of pride, confidence, hope, a 
sense of purpose and worth by identification‖ with 
an historic past and a symbolic leader (Hoffer, 
1951, p.12). They ―see themselves,‖ Hoffer 
continues, ―on the march with drums beating and 
colors flying. They are participators in a soul-
stirring drama played to a vast audience—
generations gone and generations yet to come‖ 
(Hoffer, 1951, pp. 71-72). Attention is therefore not 
focused on what is really going on in the present, 
but how an unobtainable past links to an 
unobtainable future. 
The Cult of Mao 
Mao‘s image dominated the ―now.‖ He 
promoted himself as a sympathetic authority figure 
with whom all citizens could identify. Then Mao‘s 
liberation could be their liberation (Hoffer, 1951). 
Because the Chinese people saw themselves in 
Mao, they could allow him to be raised to a god-
like state (Hoffer, 1951; Palmer, 1997). Gu Zhibin 
describes the context in which such deification can 
happen, when writing, ―traditionally, the Chinese 
government, as well as the entire Chinese nation, 
has revolved around a paramount leader… who sits 
high in the palace and decides on all affairs, big or 
small, is felt as urgently today as yesterday‖ (Gu, 
1991, pp. 89-90). 
During the Cultural Revolution, Mao, the 
demagogue, was never more preeminent. People 
addressed the dictator as his lordship. The most 
famous song during this period was ―The East is 
Red‖, chiming, ―East is Red; Sun is rising, China 
produced Mao, and he is seeking happiness for the 
people; he is our great savior‖ (1964, n.p.), 
portraying him as a supernatural dynamism in the 
universe. Comparing great forces in nature and a 
leader‘s brilliance was common in ancient Chinese 
writings to praise the emperors (Gu, 1991, Li, 
1999; Palmer, 1997).  
As earlier noted, classic political 
domination was conceptualized in familial ways. 
Emperors were both a master and father-like figure 
to subjects. And so was Mao. Consider another 
Mao cult-period lyric, ―heaven is great and earth is 
great, and they are not greater than the party‘s 
benevolence; father is dear, mother is dear, they are 
not as affectionate as Chairman Mao‖ (Li, 1996, 
n.p.). 
The Chinese Nation and Ethnic Unity 
Addressing Anderson‘s point concerning 
the struggle to maintain nationalism amidst 
diversity, Mao and the CCP fostered a national 
identity that intended to bind the sentiments of all 
ethnic groups and classes into a single unit—the 
Chinese nation (Anderson, 2006). This nationalistic 
concept traced its roots to culturalism (Duara, 
1995), in particular the Chinese middle period from 
the 8
th
 through the 15
th
 centuries when educated 
people began referring to China as a place and 
culture, ―Zhong Guo.‖ Throughout the years the 
concept became ―Zhong Guo‖ or ―China‖ and 
incorporated Han and non-Han Chinese. By the 
17
th
 century, the term was even used in formal 
documents (Leibold, 2007).  
Time and time again Mao and his 
followers promoted and hence created their view of 
the Chinese nation. At an October 1, 1950 
celebration of the PRC‘s first anniversary, PRC 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai declared, 
For thousands of years, ethnic groups were not 
united and even hated each other. This was a result 
of the oppressive policies of reactionary rules, 
particularly the imperialists and their Chinese 
running dogs in recent decades. But the situation in 
the past year has been entirely different. Due to the 
joint effort of all ethnic group people, we have 
overthrown the reactionary rule of Chiang Kai-
shek, a running dog of U.S imperialists, and 
established the PRC. Thus, the relationship among 
ethnic groups has fundamentally changed…Today, 
not only have all ethnic groups been united, but 
love of motherland has also been growing in their 
hearts. (Zhou, 1 October 1950, p.178) 
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Reiterating the theme, in 1958, Wang Feng, the 
vice Chairman of the Nationalities Affairs 
Commission, addressed the Fifth Meeting of the 
Nationalities Committee of the First National 
People‘s Congress: ―Only by uniting themselves in 
the big united family of the motherland, can the 
various nationalities of China construct socialism 
and resist imperialism. Any nationality, which 
attempts to secede from the big family of the 
motherland, is bound to leave the socialist road and 
follow the imperialist and colonial road‖ (Cited in 
Leng and Palmer, 1961, p.138). Yet, accepting 
each other was in the name of sustaining ―political 
loyalty rather than [maintaining] class or ethnic 
identity‖ (Leibold, 2007, p.106). In communist 
China, the symbolic linkages for Chinese people 
especially derived from political revolutionary 
rhetoric involving class struggle, the constitutions, 
and the national flag. 
Symbolism and the Nation 
Political Revolutionary Rhetoric 
Attending to the class issue early on, in 
―Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society‖ Mao 
wrote, ―Who are our enemies? Who are our 
friends? This is a question of the first importance 
for the revolution‖ (Mao, 1926, para.1, n.p.). Mao‘s 
essay ―On New Democracy‖ further aligned the 
lineage of ―enemies‖ to ―friends.‖ ―These classes 
(the working class, the peasantry class, urban petty 
bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie),‖ he 
penned, ―will necessarily become the basic 
components of the state and governmental structure 
in the democratic republic of China, with the 
proletariat as the leading force‖ (Mao, 1940, Ch. 4, 
n.p.). However, by 1949, counter-revolutionary 
classes (―enemies‖) included bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie, liberal intellectuals, the former KMT 
officials and soldiers, old members of the elite and 
landlords, and rich peasants. Thus, they were 
excluded from the concept of ―people.‖  
Sadly, even ―people‖ was a limited notion. 
When the CCP replaced the KMT national 
government (―Guoming‖) with the ―people‘s‖ 
government it automatically retranslated ―Guomin‖ 
(all people—even the deposed). Sun Yat-sen 
(1866-1925) had been a major player in toppling 
the Qing dynasty and helped to create the KMT 
(Perry, 2007). He became the first president of the 
1912 Provisional Republic of China and had 
referred to his countrymen as (―Guomin‖) or 
national citizens, hoping to transform them into a 
relatively mobile politically conscious citizenry. 
The CCP changed all of that taking advantage of 
the simple term ―people‖ with its own built in 
distinction between ―friends‖ and ―enemies‖ based 
upon class lines. Hence, Chinese people—some 
better than others, but no one came close to being 
free.  
The PRC National Flag 
Originally, the PRC‘s national flag 
symbolized Mao‘s earlier vision. The red 
background stands for revolutionary enthusiasm. 
The largest star symbolizes the CCP itself. The idea 
of four small stars came from another of Mao‘s 
articles, ―On the People‘s Democratic 
Dictatorship,‖ which defined the Chinese people as 
consisting of the four above social classes 
mentioned in ―On New Democracy‖ (Mao, 1940). 
As portended in the above section, initially, the 
central government boasted a majority of non-CCP 
ministry leaders, who were related to the urban 
petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie classes. 
In 1949, the Chinese People‘s Political 
Consultative Conference was established as the 
leading inclusive public organization, but quite 
soon Mao used his earlier mentioned imperial-like 
politics to change much of this. From 1949 to 1956, 
he initiated ―a new democratic society,‖ a purging 
period, which ushered in a necessary, historical, 
transitory phase to a socialist society, predicted by 
the proletariat‘s preeminence in ―On New 
Democracy‖ (Mao, 1940). This shift caused 
consternation regarding the stars on the national 
flag. Depending on the current governmental 
interpretation, the five stars simply came to be seen 
as a symbol of Chinese unity under CCP leadership 
(He and Guo, 2000). 
The PPC Constitutions 
Four formal Constitutions were written in 
1954, 1975, 1978, and 1982 respectively. The first 
was based fundamentally on the Stalin‘s Soviet 
constitution established 18 years earlier and said 
nothing about the concept of citizenship, although 
Article 1 states, ―the People's Republic of China is 
a socialist state under the people's democratic 
dictatorship led by the working class and based on 
the alliance of workers and peasants‖ (NPC 1954). 
It reiterated that various nationalities could hold 
proletarian status. The 1954 constitution‘s 
Preamble states, 
The Chinese nation (emphasis ours) is a free, 
equal, and unitary multinational family created 
jointly by the people of all its nationalities. On a 
basis of mutual assistance among all nationalities, 
anti-imperialism, anti-national enemies, and anti-
Han chauvinism and regional national chauvinism, 
the cohesion among all our nationalists will 
continue to be strengthened. (NPC, 1954)  
The 1982 Constitution continued to insure 
that ―all persons holding the People‘s Republic of 
China nationality regardless of ethnic, racial, 
religious, cultural or class difference,‖ were 
citizens who could lay claim to this status. 
However, occupants of China continued to be 
potential ―friends‖ and ―enemies.‖ For example, 
Article 1 states, ―the socialist system is the basic 
system of the People‘s Republic of China. 
Sabotage of the socialist system by any 
organization or individual is prohibited‖ (NPC 
1982). Thus, ―friends,‖ were ―people,‖ and 
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―enemies‖ were not. Hughes points to this one 
consistency when writing, ―Despite the turbulence 
of the decades of the Great Leap Forward and the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, one theme 
that remains constant in the preambles to all these 
documents is that of the CCP as the party of 
national salvation presiding over a system of 
People‘s Democratic Dictatorship‖ (Hughes, 1997, 
p.14). 
The Nation and The Chinese Dream 
Slogans continued to characterize Chinese 
communist leadership long after—Deng 
Xiaoping‘s ―spring up and reform,‖ creating a 
market economy, Jiang Zemin‘s ―Three 
Represents,‖ reasserting the Chinese People’s 
superior culture, and Hu Jintao‘s scientific 
development, leading China to a major economic 
world power (Gifford, 2013). None was as 
inspirational and identity forming as Mao‘s 
Chinese People until Xi Jinping's (2012) Chinese 
Dream, a revival of nationalism and brilliant 
cooptation of individual prosperity in support of 
collective economic and military success. 
Among many other orations, Xi‘s well-
known August 19 speech in 2003 addressed this 
notion. In full compliance with imagined national 
identity icons, Xi declared, ―The masses say that 
the Chinese Dream is the expression of an image, 
(emphasis ours) and is an expression that the 
masses can accept easily. It has established a 
struggle objective that inspires people‘s hearts, and 
has made clear the beautiful prospects of the Party 
and the country‖ (Xi, 9 August, 2013, n.p.). True to 
its revivalist, nationalistic intentions, Xi also 
discussed the Chinese Dream from an international 
perspective, declaring, ―Some Western forces 
worry that the Chinese Dream may expand China‘s 
influence in the world, and sedulously stunt, distort 
and blacken the Chinese Dream.‖ He then warned 
the people not to let critics ―confuse‖ them (Xi, 9 
August 2013, n.p.).  
As the CCP spokesperson, despite the 
emphasis on a strong military on March 29, 2014, 
Xi allayed international fears concerning Chinese 
Dreams intentions in a Paris address marking the 
50
th
 anniversary of diplomatic relations between 
People‘s Republic of China and France. Xi 
solemnly recalled, ―Napoleon Bonaparte once said 
the China is a sleeping lion and when China wakes 
up, the world will shake. In fact, the lion of China 
has awoken, but what the world sees now, is a 
peaceful, amiable, civilized lion.‖  (Cited in 
Sridharan, International Business Times, 29 March 
2014, p. n.p). The Chinese leader further 
emphasized: ―According to history, realizing the 
Chinese dream would bring opportunities rather 
than threats, peace rather than turmoil to the world. 
‖(Cited in Sridharan, International Business Times, 
29 March 2014, p. n.p).  
Napoleon‘s prophecy may be closer to the 
truth than the CCP admits (Sridharan, 2014). In 
fact the lion to a large extent symbolized the rise of 
Chinese nationalism during the late Qing period, 
when China was in deep national crisis (Shan, 
2006). Moreover, Chinese patriots have repeatedly 
used the metaphor ― sleeping lion has woken up‖ in 
response to Western powers‘ aggressions since the 
late 19
th
 century (Gries, 2005). After all the 
Chinese Dream is at least partially born in defiance 
toward the never forgotten century of humiliation.  
Once again, change in China reached back 
at least to the late Qing period that relied on a self-
important identity to support autocratic 
governmental aspirations. Moreover, Xi‘s ―lion‖ 
address resonates Mao‘s revolutionary declaration, 
― The Chinese people have stood up! China will 
never again be an insulted nation‖ (Mao, 1 
October, 1949, n.p.). A year earlier the CCP noted 
the relationship between the Chinese Dream and 
Mao‘s ancient Legalism and revolutionary ideology 
symbolized in the Chinese People. In December 23 
on the 120
th
 anniversary of Mao‘s birth in its 
official website, the government controlled bi-
monthly Qiu Shi (Seek Truth) wrote, ―Each 
Chinese communist leader, … from Mao Zedong to 
Xi Jinping dreams that China would become a 
wealthy and powerful country…Therefore, Mao 
and Xi both share the same Chinese dream‖ (Shi, 
the Ideal of Chinese Dream: From Mao Zedong to 
Xi Jingping, 23 December, 2013, n.p.).  
Thus, for the current CCP leadership, the 
Chinese Dream has become an ideological tool to 
unite the party members in coherence and stability. 
In March 2014, when taking an inspection trip to 
Lankao county, Henan province, Xi gave a speech 
during his visit in memory of the local communist 
party sectary, Jiao Yulu who died in 1964 while 
laboring for Mao‘s Chinese people (Since his 
death, Jiao had become a moral CCP symbol). In 
his speech, Xi personally encouraged people to 
follow the model of comrade Jiao in order to 
realize Chinese Dream (Xi, 17 March 2014, p., 
n.p). In sum, Tao Xie observes, ―if the dreams of 
the ordinary Chinese today-—like those of their 
ancestors in ancient China—depend on the good 
luck of having a sage leader, however, that means 
China is still under the rule of man, not rule of law. 
When the leader steps down, or if that leader makes 
disastrous decisions, the dreams of the Chinese 
people will be in jeopardy‖ (Cited in Xie, CNN 
World, 14 March 2014, n.p.).  
Discussion 
Essentially there is nothing inherently 
wrong with imagining. People appreciate art by 
imagining what it looks like and means to them. 
They imagine unachieved goals in an attempt to 
accomplish them. But to only imagine is not to live 
and truly experience life. When political leaders 
rule people austerely, mollify subjects with 
meaningful signifiers (Blumer, 1969; Blumer and 
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Morrione, 2004; Mead, 1934/1967), and portray 
them as abstractly triumphant, the state benefits far 
more than the individual, or, for that matter, 
collective subcultures within the larger polity.  
Any authoritarian or powerful 
government, however, can allow a certain amount 
of individual freedom to placate its citizens. For 
example, by 2020 some predict that 20 percent of 
the Chinese people will financially be doing quite 
well (Zheng, 2012). But that could abruptly end, 
perhaps not without protest. So for now it is more 
efficacious for the CCP to herald not necessarily 
political but socioeconomic Chinese Dream 
aspirations by allowing some to attain opulence, 
proclaiming a collective victory over pre-
revolutionary oppressors.  
The CCP has proved that historically it is 
by no means the initiator of such machinations. In 
fact it has profited from China‘s cultural, political 
past, suggesting the communist revolution merely 
continued an ancient legacy of subservience. 
Although possibly a Eurocentric assessment, well 
more than a century past, Hegel observed that 
fixedness, stability, and convention characterizes 
Chinese culture, writing, ―The unity of 
substantiality and subjective freedom so entirely 
excludes the distinction and contrast of the two 
elements…that…substance cannot arrive at 
reflection on itself—at subjectivity. The Substantial 
in its moral aspect, rules therefore, not as the moral 
disposition of the Subject, but as the despotism of 
the Sovereign‖ (Hegel, 2007, n.p.). 
Confucianism-Legalism helped centralize 
centuries of such despotism, producing scholars 
who Sino-centrically felt superior to the outside 
world. Confucianism on its own may have been 
benevolent, but its acceptance of incontrovertible 
authority gave Legalism the opportunity to instill 
Chinese culture with obedient self-importance, 
making people ripe for identity manipulation 
(Hoffer, 1957). When Confucian scholars enjoyed 
feeling loftier than "barbarians," they could labor 
under the assumption that they were self-
actualized. But this feeling was encased within a 
world of psychological and physical subjection to 
the imperial family. As Hegel again points out, 
―although the Emperor has the right of a Monarch, 
standing at the summit of a political edifice, he 
exercises it paternally. He is the Patriarch, and 
everything in the State that can make any claim to 
reverence is attached to him‖ (Hegel, 2007, n.p.). 
Our work extends Hegel‘s observations into the 
current century, explaining how an ancient political 
legacy, contemporary revolutionary language, and 
other icons helped construct a Chinese national 
identity as an imagined Chinese people in pursuit 
of an imagined Chinese Dream. 
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